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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

TENTH CIRCUIT
Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that the government's allowing private parties to use
public lands is an implied license, revocable at-will by the government,
and vests no private property interests in individual licensees).
Kit and Sherry Laney, owners and operators of Diamond Bar Cattle
Company and Laney Cattle Company, initiated this action on April 1,
1996, seeking adjudication and validation of interests in certain public
lands. The Laneys claimed they owned a vested water right and an
inseparable but distinct right to graze the federal lands compromising
their allotments. The Forest Service denied this interest and advised
the Laneys that unpermitted grazing on Forest Service land would
result in fees, penalties and civil trespass action. The district court
granted summary judgment for the Forest Service and enjoined
appellants from grazing livestock on national forest lands without a
permit.
The Laneys claimed their water right arose from their
predecessor's prior appropriation. The Laney's predecessors obtained
title prior to 1899 when the United States withdrew the land from the
public domain. This land later became the Gila and Apache National
Forests. The Laneys asserted this pre-1899 appropriation vested in
their predecessor a "possessory" property interest entitling the holder
to use of the water and range for grazing purposes. The Laneys
claimed that this long-standing property right, acquired under New
Mexico law, obviated the need for them to obtain grazing permits
from the Forest Service.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment, finding that grazing cattle on public lands was permitted by
an implied license, revocable at the will of the Forest Service. Before
the federal government reserved these lands as national forests, New
Mexico law permitted cattle grazing within the public domain. The
law required, as a prerequisite, that individuals possess adequate water
rights to meet the needs of their cattle grazing there.
This
appropriation gave the holder the privilege to use the public lands.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the nature of this privilege was an
implied license, revocable by will of the licensor.
Article IV of the United States Constitution provides Congress with
plenary power when disposing of or regulating the territories and
properties of the United States. Pursuant to this authority, Congress
passed the Organic Administration Act of 1897, authorizing the
government to reserve lands as national forests. The Act placed these
lands under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture and
permitted this office to make all necessary rules and regulations
concerning the management of reserved lands. Under this grant of
authority, the Secretary of Agriculture, as early as 1906, began
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promulgating regulations requiring permits to graze stock on national
forest lands. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that historical
acquiescence on the part of the federal government allowing private
use of public lands was never intended to confer any vested right. This
"tacit consent" by the government does not deprive it of the power
to
recall any implied license.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Laneys did not hold and
never held a vested private property right to graze cattle on federal
public lands. The Laneys' predecessor in title held simply an implied
license to use the lands for grazing. This privilege conferred no vested
rights and was revocable at the government's will. Thus, without
regard to the validity of predecessor's claimed water right, the Laneys
were not entitled to graze cattle on national forest lands without a
permit. Additionally, the court upheld the district court's assessment
of penalties and injunction for unpermitted grazing.
John B. Ridgley

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
stormwater discharged during timber harvesting and land
development activities fell within the Clean Water Act's ("CWA")
definition of "pollutant" from a "point source" into "navigable water"
and landowner's failure to make every good faith effort to comply with
pollution control standards and failure to reduce discharges to a
minimum precluded application of the exception to liability under
CWA for discharge without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit even though no permit was available to be
issued by the state).
Adams owned 76 acres of land in the mountains of North Georgia.
The Driscoll and Galbreath families owned land adjacent to Adams'
property. Driscoll owned five acres directly abutting Adams' property,
and Galbreath owned approximately two acres adjacent to Driscoll's.
The Spiva Branch stream flowed downhill from Adams' property
through a pond on Driscoll's property and then through another
pond on Galbreath's property before merging into another river.
Adams began harvesting timber in March of 1995 in order to
develop his property for vacation homes. He cut and graded roads,
installed storm pipes, and removed timber. This activity caused
erosion which Adams did little to prevent. This erosion caused
considerable damage to Driscoll's and Galbreath's properties. Adams
did not seek proper approval from any federal, state, or local
government agency before starting work on his property.
In
September 1996, Adams filed for the required state permit after

